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Abstract 
Indonesia had the economic and political crisis in mid-1997 through 1999. This crisis 
resulted in bank performance down even a loss. The banks are also experiencing 
financial hardship issues, loan loss and the threat bangkrup. A unique characteristic of 
Indonesian banking system is the existence of regional development banks (Bank 
Pembangunan Daerah), which is owned by local governments. This study examines the 
performance of this type of banks compared to private between regional development 
banks and federal government banks. Also this study examines the factors influence of 
bank performance. Measurement bank performance are Return On Assets (ROA) and 
Return On Equity (ROE). The sample of this study consists of 15 community development 
banks, 56 private banks, and 3 central  government banks from 1997 to 1999. Using 
panel data methodologies, we find that community development banks and federal 
government banks perform at least as good as the private banks. Dummy equity, 
economic growth, equity ratio, loan ratio, cost ratio and total assets influence bank 
performance during economic crisis in Indonesia. 





The principal types of banks in the modern industrial world are commercial banks which 
are typically private owned banks and government owned banks.  The objectives of these 
two banks are similar where they focus on maintaining higher profitability. These two 
types of banks can be found in most countries in the world, but the uniqueness of 
Indonesian banking system is that there is another category of banks, which is called the 
community development banks.  
Community development banks in Indonesia exist in every district. They are monetary 
organizations operated on a local basis. In terms of coverage, their coverage is much 
more smaller than the private and the publicly owned banks.  
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The commercial banks and the community development banks serve different niche of 
customers. They also have different ways of carrying out their duties and cater for 
different market. Hence this study will try to identify whether the ownership pattern will 
affect the bank performance. Research have shown that private banks are better because 
their motive of profitability will forced them to work hard to ensure that they get the 
maximum profit as they can. But what about the community banks?  They also give loans 
or credit to local people and perform other functions of a bank – do they perform better 
than private banks or the other way round? These are the questions that the study wishes 
to answer.  
The financial crisis will affect the borrower. Individuals may lose jobs while the company 
will suffer losses. This will increase the amount of bad debts and in turn affected the 
profit of a bank. The financial crisis has caused banks in Indonesia experienced financial 
difficulties and declining profits. The financial crisis also caused changes in the 
composition of the number of private banks and central government. The government had 
to liquidated the 16 banks in 1997, 38 banks in 1999 and takeover the operations of seven 
banks in April 1998. At the same time people's confidence in the banking system has 
deteriorated, especially after the government to liquidated for the 16 banks from 
operating in November 1997. 
 
Table 1 
Summary Of Bank Industry Highlights During Economic Crisis In Indonesia  
 State bank Private bank Regional 
development bank 
 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 
Number 
of banks 
7 5 144 92 27 27 
Branches 218 316 29 39 20 20 
Assets* 201.9 417.3 248.7 291.6 12.3 18.8 
Loans* 153.3 112.3 168.7 56.0 7.5 6.8 
Deposits* 133.0 312.2 177.2 252.9 8.8 14.0 
Capital* 13.8 (17.7) 25.2 (10.2) 1.3 2.0 
Source : Bank Indonesia 





From Table 1 above shows economic crisis in Indonesia had an influence on the banking 
industry where the number of state and private ownership except for regional 
development bank reduced the bank. Assets, loans and capital (except the regional 
development banks) decreased for all three types of banks. However, for deposits 
increased because people would rather save money in the bank due to high interest rates 
and unstable macroeconomic condition. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been numerous studies on bank ownership and its relationship with 
performance where performance is measured by return on assets and return on equity. 
Athanasoglou et al. (2008) find that the ownership structure does not play a significant 
role in banks performance.  Barros et al. (2007) use 7,635 observations from 1,384 
European commercial banks for a period of 1993 to 2001.  Their study finds that 
ownership structure does play a role in the performance of the banks.  These findings are 
confirmed by Lin and  Zhang (2008) where by using data from China for a period from 
1997 to 2004, they find that the performance of banks owned by government are typically 
operating at a lower profit and  lower efficiency when compared with private and foreign 
banks. Micco et al. (2007) find that government owned banks have significant negative 
relationship with performance in developed countries while foreign banks have positive 
relationship with performance in these countries. The study finds that government owned 
banks tend to have a low profit with higher operating costs which is in contrast to foreign 
banks. Cornett et al. (2010) show that besides having lower profitability state-owned 
banks also held lower core capital and had greater credit risk compared to privately 
owned banks prior to 2001, that is periods around the Asian financial crisis.  Micco et al. 
(2007) look at the relationship between bank ownership and performance  in the 
industrialized economy and developing countries. The results show that in developing 
countries, government banks typically have lower profitability, lower margin and higher 
overhead cost than private banks. This results is in contrast with foreign banks. For 
industrialised countries, the study find that there is no correlation between ownership and 
performance. Reaz (2005), Beck et al. (2005), Berger et al. (2005), Fries and Taci (2005), 
Omran (2007), Iannotta et al. (2007) and Farazi et al. (2011) show that the performance 
of private banks are better than banks owned by government.  
Many studies have documented that  banks owned by government normally have lower 
profit, higher operating costs and low quality of assets compared to banks owned by 
private party (Berger et al., 2005). Berger et al. (2005) find that government banks in 
Argentina increase their performance after being privatized. Cornett et al. (2010) look at 
differences in performance of government owned banks and private banks in 16 countries 
for the period 1989 and 1998.  Overall, they confirm previous findings that  government 
owned banks  have lower profit and lower amount of capital, higher risk and less liquid. 
By using a sample of 100 banks in developed countries, Mian (2006) conclude that the 
lower performance of government owned banks are the results of inefficient management 
and they depend on government support to stay alive. But Zhang and Yang (2011) show 
that the performance if majority of banks stock is in the hand of government are better 




A few studies have also shown that government owned banks distort the economic 
development of a nation (La Porta et al., 2002; Galindo & Micco, 2004). The reason is 
that the purpose of these banks are more towards political agenda rather than economic 
and social agenda. La Porta et al. (2002), for example, show that bank owned by 
government in 1970’s is related to  low financial and economic development.   
Barth et al. (2004) study find that government owned banks have negative relationship 
with profit but positive relationship with corruption. Micco et al. (2006) find the lending 
performance of government owned banks increased as election time gets nearer.  
Indonesian banking master plan requires all banks must have a minimum capital of 100 
billion rupiah at the latest by the end of 2010. The study uses a dummy equity have not 
been conducted by researchers, but studies Pasioras and Kosmidou (2007) and Ben 
Neceur and Goaied (2008) showed that the number of high equity is better because it will 
reduce bank operating costs and reduce the risk of bankruptcy. 
 
Davydenko (2010), Mirzaei et al. (2011) and Sufian and Habibullah (2012) found that 
economic growth is positive on bank performance. This shows that the higher the 
economic growth performance of banks as economic activity using the bank as a loan 
fund. While the economy is good, companies will pay their loans. 
 
Berger and Bonaccorsi (2006), Mashharawi and Al-Zu’bi (2009), Barry et al. (2011) and 
Hoffmann (2011) found that equity to total assets ratio influence negative to ROE. This 
indicates that the cost of the agency consistent with the theory that the increased use of 
debt can increase ROE. Davydenko (2010), Barry et al. (2011) and Sufian and Habibullah 
(2012) found that the the ratio of equity to total assets influence positive to ROA. This 
indicates a high equity ratio will improve the ability to overcome the loss of bank assets, 
including loans, increasing the income from the reduction in bankruptcy costs, obtain 
higher profits if doing the expansion in bank products offer several benefits. High equity 
can reduce the amount of capital from outside the capital cost is higher than equity so as 
to reduce bank profits and as the strength of the financial risk and increase the deposit 
protection for the unstable macroeconomic conditions. 
 
The ratio of loans to total assets to be able to reduce the negative influence of liquid 
assets of banks, bad debts increase, banks quickly increase the amount of the loan will 
pay the higher cost of capital so as to reduce the demand for bank earnings. This study is 
compatible with Bashir (2003) and Beck et al. (2005) found that the ratio of loans to 
assets influence negative to bank perfomance. 
  
Operating costs to total assets ratio will affect bank performance. If the operating cost is 
high, then the bank's performance will be lower. This indicates that banks with higher 
productivity and efficiency will always keep operating expenses low. The study Beck et 
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al. (2005), and Mashharawi and Al-Zu'bi (2009) and Mirzaei et al. (2011) found that the 
ratio of operating costs to total assets ratio has a negative impact on ROA and ROE. 
While Althanasoglou et al. (2008) and Davydenko (2010) found that the costs have a 
negative impact on ROA. While Sufian and Chong (2008) and Mirzaei et al. (2011) 
found that total assets has a negative impact on ROA and ROE for the economy in down. 
This is because the agency costs, the bureaucracy and costs that affect the management of 
large companies. 
 
Studies in Indonesia, so far have looked into the performance of banks but did not study 
the effect of ownership structure on the performance of banks.  For example, Surifah 
(2002) analyze the performance of Indonesian banks before and after economic crisis 
using the CAMEL (Capital, Assets, Monitoring, Efficiency and Liquidity) ratio. The 
study show that these ratios differ significantly before and after the economic crisis. 
Payamta and Machfoedz (2002) evaluate Indonesian  banking  performance before and 
after the banks going public while Luciana and Winny (2005) look at factors that 
contributes to financial distress in banking sector.   
 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
The population consists of 124 banks which are 5 government banks, 92 private banks 
and 27 regional development banks. The study did not include foreign banks and mixed 
bank because of difficulty in getting the data. From the 124 banks, only 74 banks were 
selected to be the sample. The banks are 56 private banks, 3 government banks, and 15 
regional development banks.. The period under study is from 1997 to 1999. The data are 
taken from banks’ annual reports. 
To test if state ownership influences performance of banks, the following model is 
estimated: 




ROAit : Return on asset of bank i in period t 
ROEit : Return on asset of bank i in period t,  
DCGit : A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if bank i is controlled by central 
government in period t, zero otherwise, 
DRDBit : A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if bank i is controlled by 
regional development banks in period t, zero otherwise, 
DEQUITYit : A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if bank i has equity in low 
of 100 million rupiah in period t, zero otherwise, 
EGit : Economic growth experienced in period t where economic growth is measured by 
GDP growth rate, 
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Z : A matrix of control variables, which included, total equity to total assets (EQUITY), 
total loans to total assets (LOANS), operating costs to total assets (COSTS), natural 
logarithm of total assets (ASETS). 
eit : error term of bank i in period t.  
 
Variables 
The dependent variable is return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) . The 
independent variables are as follows:  
1. Banks ownership: It has been documented that ownership structure play a role in 
banks performance.  Types of ownership can influence banks decisions. Since there are 
three types of banks, we use two dummy variables. Dummy central government (DCG) 
takes on a value of one for government-controlled banks and zero otherwise while 
dummy community development banks (DRDB) takes on a value of one for community 
development banks and zero otherwise. Based on the literature, we expect that both 
coefficients should be negative. 
2. Economic growth: We expect that during good period, banks’ profits would rise 
as borrowers are more willing to borrow to finance either their consumption or 
investment. Given that during the period of this study, Indonesia experienced fluctuating 
economic performance, we expect that economic growth has a positive impact on ROA. 
3. Equity: It is the intention of Indonesian government to increase the equity amount 
of banks to at least 100 million rupiah to withstand economic uncertainties. This study 
will test the appropriateness of this decision. If smaller banks are less likely to withstand 
severe economic downturn, then the coefficient of equity, which will be proxy by 
Dummy equity (DEQUITY), should be negative. However, it could also be argued that 
smaller banks will be more responsible in their lending activities since they know that 
imprudent lending decision would more likely to lead to bankruptcy as compared to 
larger banks. 
4. Control variables: There are six financial control variables that are used in this 
study. Those variables are: 
A. Capital structure: A bank that carries a high level of debt may face the 
problem of not being able to service the debt in the future, hence affecting 
the performance.  Capital structure is measured by equity to total assets. 
B. Banks risk: Loans to total assets is variable measuring bank risk. Loans 
ratio measured by the ratio of total loans to total assets. Loans are the main 
interest-bearing assets and therefore the expected effect on bank 
profitability is positive.  
C. Efficiency: The more efficient is the bank, the higher will be the profit. 
Cost efficiency is measured by operating cost to total assets. Cost 
efficiency is expected to have a negative impact on profitability because 
efficiency banks expected to operate at lower cost. 
D. Size: Size also plays a role in performance. The bigger is the size of a 
bank, the better would be the performance of a bank. Size is measured by 




4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variable that are used in the analysis. The 
profit rates have a mean -2.82% of total assets and a standard deviation of 19.58%. The  
mean negative because economic crisis in Indonesia. The mean ROE is 7.90% but with 
the standard deviation of 124.13%, the high values of standard deviation indicated that 
the profitability of the sample banks is somewhat inconsistent. the mean value of 
EQUITY is 8.45% and a standard deviation of 23.81%. LOANS is 45.02% and a standard 
deviation of 24.97%. COSTS is 14.15% and a standard deviation of 22.46% and the mean 
ASSETS is 271.40% but with the standard deviation of 178.1%. EG is range from 4.70% 
to -13.10%. DCG, DRDB and DEQUITY are dummy variable in this study.  
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics  
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ROE1 205 -3.9454 9.5348 .079028 1.2413145 
ROA 222 -1.4028 .6312 -.028179 .1958420 
EQUITY 222 -1.3144 .7206 .084488 .2380966 
LOANS 222 .0214 1.7744 .450244 .2497181 
COSTS 222 .0035 1.7203 .141464 .2246097 
ASSETS 222 24.0808 32.2131 27.139816 1.7811467 
EG 222 -13.10 4.70 -2.4667 7.68646 
DCG 222 .00 1.00 .0405 .19767 
DRDB 222 .00 1.00 .2027 .40292 
DEQUITY 222 .00 1.00 .7883 .40944 
 
1For ROE, 17 bank-year are dropped since these banks have negative total equity.  
Table 3 
Correlation Matrix 
 ROE ROA DCG DRDB DEQUITY EG EQUITY LOANS COSTS ASSETS 
ROE 1.00          
ROA -0.29    1.00         
DCG 0.37   -0.33    1.00        
DRDB -0.09    0.14   -0.10 1.00       
DEQUITY 0.05   -0.13   -0.12 0.04    1.00      
EG -0.12    0.21    0.00 0.00   -0.14    1.00     
EQUITY -0.41    0.80  -0.44  0.03   -0.07    0.15    1.00    
LOANS 0.03   -0.20    0.17   -0.03   -0.05    0.19   -0.15 1.00   
COSTS 0.30   -0.67    0.40   -0.10    0.01   -0.21   -0.67 0.12   1.00  
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ASSETS 0.30   -0.44    0.45   -0.02   -0.53   -0.02  -0.52 0.03    0.37  1.00 
 
Table 3 provides information on the degree of correlation between the explanatory 
variables used in the multivariate regression analysis. The matrix shows that in general 
the correlation between the variable that are used in the analysis is not strong suggesting 
that multicollinearity problem are either not severe or non-existent. Kennedy (2008) 
points out that multicollinearity is a problem when the correlation is above 0.80, which is 
not the case here. 
Table 4 
Regression Without Adjusting And With Robust Standard Errors                  
Variable OLS without standard errors OLS with robust standard errors                  




0.000***         
-2.9321 
0.163        
.48992 
0.012**          
-2.9321 
0.308            
DCG .07241 
0.009***      
1.4078 
0.002***          
.0724 
.089*        
1.4078 
0.065*     
DRDB .03461 
   0.003***      
-.20969 
0.269        
.03461 
0.000***         
-.20969 
0.233     
DEQUITY -.06295  
  0.000***     
.41097 
0.107        
-.06295 
0.001***        
.41097 
0.106     
EG .00121 
   0.057*     
-.01080 
0.301        
.00121 
0.061*        
-.01080 
0.274     
EQUITY .28332 
   0.000***      
-1.2170 
0.020**         
.28332 
0.000***          
-1.2170 
0.073*     
LOANS -.06565 
   0.001***     
-.11315 
0.724        
-.06565 
0.000***        
-.11315 
0.660     
COSTS -.13548 
   0.000***     
-.12802 
0.784        
-.13548   
0.007***     
-.12802 
0.891     
ASSETS -.01647   
  0.000***     
.11046 
0.116         
-.01647 
0.013**        
.11046 
0.263     
     
R-squared 0.7292 0.2362 0.7292 0.2362 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7190 0.2076 0.7190 0.2076 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number observation 222 222 222 222 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, p-value in parentheses 
 
Table 4 presents the pooled regression results without adjusting standard errors and with 
robust standard errors for heteroscedasticity. When we test for heteroscedasticity using 
Breusch-Pagan test, we find that we can reject the null hypothesis of equal variances. 
Thus, a better estimation model should account for heteroscedasticity Table 4 reports the 
results based on adjusted standard errors using heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard error. 
We find that all coefficients are significant  for ROA and two coefficients are significant 
for  ROE. To ensure that there is no problem of multicollinearity, variance inflation factor  
(VIF) are estimated and since the results show that the VIF are below 10. Outlier problem 
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improvement with 0.5 percent truncated approach ( Fama & French, 1992). The results 
show that in term of bank ownership, community development banks have ROA of 
3.46% higher than private banks and it is significant at 1% and central government bank 
have ROA of 7.24% higher than private banks and it is significant at 1%. These results 
seem surprising from agency theory as managers of community development banks have 
no ownership interest in banks. Thus we expect that there would be higher agency 
problem for these types of banks. However, positive coefficient of community 
development banks could be explained in terms of their lending activities. These banks 
lend to government staff and it is very difficult to terminate the employment contract of 
government staff. Thus these types of customers have the ability to pay even during 
economic downturn and the risk of community development bank is less. Second 
explanation is that since they only serve in one province they have specialized knowledge 
about that province. A third explanation is that since the survival of local government 
depends on the performance of local banks, mismanagement of these banks might 
indicate the incompetence of local elected officials. Thus the officials have more 
incentives to monitor local banks. Also, government banks have positive relationships 
with performance. The results contradicts findings in Reaz (2005), Beck et al. (2005), 
Berger et al. (2005), Fries and Taci (2005), Micco, Panizza and Yanez (2007) Omran 
(2007), Iannotta et al. (2007) and Farazi et al. (2011) where we find that community 
development banks perform better than private banks and government owned banks 
perform as good as private banks. But  the The results consistent with Zhang and Yang 
(2011) show that the performance if majority of banks stock is in the hand of government 
are better than banks owned by private bank during finance crisis in China.  
The results for the impact of EG on ROA is consistent whith the results of Davydenko 
(2010), Mirzaei et al. (2011) and Sufian and Habibullah (2012) provides support  the 
argument of positive association between economic growth and banking sector 
performance. 
 
EQUITY is negative and significant impact on ROE. The emperical finding is 
consistent with Berger and Bonaccorsi (2006), Mashharawi and Al-Zu'bi (2009), Barry 
et al. (2011) and Hoffmann (2011) found that the negative effect on equity ratio ROE. 
This indicates that the cost of the agency consistent with the theory that the increased 
use of debt can increase ROE. Therefore EQUITY is positively to ROA. The emperical 
finding is consistent Davydenko (2010), Barry et al. (2011) and Sufian and Habibullah 
(2012). 
 
LOANS exhibits a negative and significant impact on ROA. The emperical finding is 
consistent with Bashir (2003) and Beck et al. (2005). COSTS exhibits a negative and 
significant impact on bank profitability. The results imply that an increase (decrease) 
in these expenses reduces (increases) the profits of banks operating in Indonesia during 
economic crisis. The emperical finding is consistent with Beck et al. (2005), 
Mashharawi and Al-Zu’bi (2009) and Mirzaei et al. (2011). ASSETS a negative and 
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significant impact on ROA. The emperical finding is consistent with Sufian and Chong 
(2008) and Mirzaei et al. (2011). 
 
Table 5 
Regression With  Random Effects 
Variable ROA ROE 
Constan .48878  (0.000)*** -2.9321 (0.161) 
DCG .07347 (0.024)** 1.4078 (0.002)*** 
DRDB .03512 (0.011)** -.20969 (0.267) 
DEQUITY -.07029(0.000)*** .41097 (0.105) 
EG .00106 (0.060)* -.01080 (0.300) 
EQUITY .29541 (0.000)*** -1.2170 (0.019)** 
LOANS -.05702 (0.002)*** -.11315 (0.723) 
COSTS -.13181 (0.000)*** -.12802 (0.783) 
ASSETS -.01643(0.000)*** .11046 (0.115) 
R-squared 0.7283 0.2362 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Number observation 222 222 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, p-value in parentheses 
 
Finally, we estimate our model using random effects. The results in table 5 confirm the 
previous findings where the community developments banks and central government 
banks perform better. Government banks maintain the positive relationships with 
performance. The Breusch and Pagan Langrangian multiplier test (LM) test shows that 
random effect is a better estimation technique compared to pooled OLS. Therefore, our 
study chooses the random effects model as our estimation technique. The results of 
random effects model are similar to the results of pooled OLS without standard errors and 







In this paper, we examine the performance of community development banks, 
government owned banks and private banks during economic crisis in Indonesia from 
1997 to 1999. Our study uncovers interesting results. We find that community 
development banks and central government banks perform better than private banks. This 
study also shows that economic growth plays a significant factor in explaining banks 
performance. However, the study also reveals that dummy for equity is a negative and 
significant impact on ROA. It shows that Indonesian government decision to introduce 
equity of 100 billion rupiah might affect bank performance. EQUITY, LOANS, COSTS 
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